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1 Introduction 
On the 21th of July 2012, President Vladimir Putin signed in to law bill No. 121-FZ, named 
Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-Commercial Organizations 
Performing the Function of Foreign Agents, commonly referred to as the Foreign Agent 
Law. These amendments compel any politically active non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) receiving funding or other property from foreign sources to enter into a special 
roaster with the Russian Ministry of Justice (MoJ) as “non-commercial organizations 
performing the function of foreign agents”.1 Numerous legal experts and the overall 
international community have criticized the law for its broad scope of interpretation, the 
speed with which it was adopted and the excessive burdens it imposes on NGOs.2 The UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association as well as 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (HRD) expressed their 
reservations in a joint statement urging the Russian government not to adopt the legislation, 
claiming that it constitutes a direct affront to those wishing to freely exercise their right to 
freedom of association.3 
 
Russian human rights organizations are maintaining that the pejorative term “foreign 
agent” is designed to generate mistrust towards NGOs among the general public and ruin 
their credibility making it difficult for them to operate effectively in society. The broad 
terminology used in the provisions and the high degree of discretion accredited to the MoJ 
who is in charge of applying the regulation is claimed to be opening up for arbitrary 
application of the law. The Russian government on the other hand, maintains that the 
amendments are legitimate and in accordance with internationally set rules, and that the 
aim of the law is to regulate the unrestricted NGO community by guaranteeing 
                                                
 1	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents,	  2012	  Article	  1.2b	  2	  Laws	  of	  Attrition	  Report,	  2013	  p.	  13	  3	  OHCHR,	  Joint	  Statement,	  2012	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transparency, objectivity and preventing foreign the in their internal affairs of the country.4  
 
Freedom of association and expression are internationally set standards that specify the 
criterions for legitimate restrictions placed on civil society actors. This paper seeks to 
determine whether Russia is violating their international obligations by adopting and 
enforcing the Foreign Agent Law through examining the legitimacy of the provisions. A 
broader examination of the social, political and legal context in which the law has come 
about and the manner in which it is being implemented will provide a more competent 
understanding of its objectives and intent, as well as the possible implications it creates for 
the Russian NGO community. The connotations that accompany with the word “foreign 
agent” will also be explained with reference to historical developments in order to clarify 
and recognize how and why the legislation has triggered such provocation. The analysis 
will expose the various legal, administrative and operational implications of the law for 
non-governmental organizations, and clarify how the requirements will affect the 
organization’s overall autonomy. Such considerations will assist in determining whether 
the Foreign Agent Law fulfils the conditions for legitimate interference with the freedom of 
association and expression as stipulated in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The research question is therefore the 
following:  
 
What are the possible implications of the Foreign Agent Law for non-governmental 
organizations receiving foreign funding in Russia, and how can this be said to interfere 
with their freedom of association and expression? Are the provisions of the law in 
accordance with the limitation clauses as specified in the European Convention of Human 
Rights, Article 11§2 and 10§2? 
 
                                                
 4	  Bogoroditskii,	  2010	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1.1 Outline 
The introductory chapter starts with presenting the methodological approach taken 
throughout the writing process, and raises several issues with regards to studying and 
writing about a law that is so new, and whose concrete effects haven’t had the time to 
materialize properly. This is followed with a clarification of the sources and structure of 
Russian law, with an emphasis on civil society legislation and their incorporated 
international commitments. Section 1.3.1 introduces the main provisions of the Foreign 
Agent Law in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of its scope and content. 
This is followed by an update of the most recent events and undertakings by the executive 
powers with regards to the application of the law, consequently verifying the fears that the 
NGO community in Russia has expressed before it came into force. These incidents 
emphasize the need to critically examine the law as it stands today, and question the 
motives behind its implementation.  
 
Chapter 2 places the Foreign Agent Law within a broader legislative trend that has emerged 
in Russia after Putin’s third inauguration as President by presenting other recently adopted 
laws which bear hallmarks of state interference with the freedom of association and 
expression. The cumulative effects of these legal restrictions are creating a challenging 
environment for civil society actors to work in. Furthermore, the scepticism that the 
Russian authorities are feeling towards Western funding rationalizes the adoption of the 
Foreign Agent law with reference to certain historical trends. Section 2.1 describes more in 
detail the first legal measure initiated by the government with the purpose of ensuring NGO 
transparency aimed particularly, but not only, at foreign funded NGOs, namely the 2006 
NGO law. The knowledge of the requirements that this particular law specifies are 
important when evaluating the necessity and urgency of adopting the 2012 amendments, as 
well as the proportionality assessment of their provisions. Section 2.2 and 2.3 emphasize 
the severity of the implications of the Foreign Agent Law by referring to NGO’s 
dependency on foreign support, due to other domestic obstructive regulations and the lack 
of government and private funding possibilities. 
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Chapter 3 specifies the international rules created for the protection of civil society from 
unjustified and unlawful state interference, which will be used when examining the 
legitimacy of the amendments. These include freedom of association, freedom of 
expression, as well as the right to seek and secure resources. The criteria for the legitimate 
interference with these rights are specified and described more in detail in section 3.3. Part 
3.4 seeks to establish why the right to seek and secure resources is such a crucial aspect of 
NGO’s independence as well as an essential part of their freedom of association. It further 
explains how the law interferes with NGOs entitlements as autonomous organizations by 
attaching a pejorative status to certain of their funding routines.   
 
In order to fairly evaluate the legitimacy of the law, an assessment of Russia’s justification 
for introducing the amendments is important. Chapter 4 therefore explains the governments 
need to regulate the NGO community, and also seeks to establish the adequacy of their 
presented reasons. Chapter 5 determines whether the law constitutes an interference with 
the organization’s freedom of association and expression by discussing the implications a 
“foreign agent” status can have on their credibility and reputation. It subsequently reviews 
the law in line with the limitation clauses as set out in Article 11§2 and 10§2 of the ECHR. 
Sections 5.2 - 5.4 evaluate whether the provisions are corresponding to the “prescribed by 
law”, “pursuing a legitimate aim” and “necessary in a democratic society” criterions in 
order to determine whether Russia is violating their international human rights obligations 
through the implementation of these amendments. This consequently entails a 
proportionality assessment where factors such as the extent and scope of the interference 
are discussed and balanced against the urgency and potential social benefits of introducing 
the restriction. These findings will determine in what ways the law is affecting the overall 
autonomy and operating space of civil society organizations in Russia. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The research of this paper is qualitative in nature, principally based on a desk study and 
supplemented with some semi-structured interviews conducted in Moscow from the 27th of 
February till the 6th of March 2013, with representatives from Golos organization, Human 
 6 
Rights Centre Memorial and the Norwegian Embassy. The interviews were informal with a 
flexible structure that provided the representatives the possibility to speak more openly and 
freely about matters that were of importance to them and their case. The relevant topics and 
some general questions were prepared in advance, but their order, specification and follow-
up was constructed throughout the talks. The goal of the interviews was not the comparison 
of the answers, so this way of structuring the meetings seemed as the most fruitful way to 
get in-depth and personalized knowledge on the topic. It provides a good balance between 
standardisation and flexibility.5  
 
The methodological approach can be described as an external approach of law in practise, 
meaning the examination of how legal institutions and rules exist in a society within its 
social, cultural or political context.6 It emphasizes the disparity between “law in the book”, 
which is a typical internal approach, and “law in action”, and demonstrates how the internal 
content and form of the law moves into social reality through its application and 
interpretation in a given social and political framework. This method attempts to 
investigate and understand legal phenomena and the role of the law in society on the basis 
of multi-disciplinary work.7 This paper accordingly discusses how the provisions of the 
Foreign Agent Law can affect the work of NGOs within the Russian context, assessing its 
consequences with reference to their political, historical and social trends. It is, however, 
important to keep in mind that at the time of this writing the outcome of the cases that have 
been initiated against organizations being in breach of the law has not yet been determined, 
and so the law’s overall effects have not had the proper time to materialize. Assessing its 
potential effects will therefore to a certain degree be based on probability, and on the 
assumption that there are certain hidden motives in the wording of the law. This 
assumption is based on the critiques of the law coming from legal experts, United Nations 
(UN) actors, governments as well as national and international civil society organizations. 
It is also strengthened when considering the broader political and legislative trend that has 
                                                
 5	  Johannessen	  et.al,	  2006	  p.	  139	  
6	  McGrudden	  2006,	  p.	  634	  
7	  McGrudden	  2006,	  p.	  637-­‐638	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emerged in Russia, where people in political opposition as well as human rights defenders 
have been subject to harassment, threats, violence and judicial persecution.8  
 
The legal structure and interpretation of Russian law will be presented more in detail in 
chapter 2, but it is important to establish the relationship and precedence of the sources 
when evaluating the recently adopted amendments. The Constitution is the supreme basis 
of law in Russia, and a major legislative document. All other legal acts, such as legislation 
passed by the constituent components of the Russian Federation, must accordingly be in 
accordance with the laws as stipulated in the Constitution. The Foreign Agent Law 
introduces alterations to certain federal laws, which regulate issues included into the 
executive authority of the Russian Federation. The Constitution provides them priority and 
direct effect throughout its whole territory.9 These modifications have been evaluated 
against recognized standards of international human rights law, to which the Russian 
Federation has dedicated themselves to through the ratification of international conventions 
and treaties. These rights take precedence over domestic legislation, meaning that should 
an international treaty establish rules that differ from those established by domestic law, the 
internationally set rules will prevail.10 The focus of the analysis has therefore been to 
determine whether Russia is violating their international obligations, which amount to the 
highest source of law according to their legal system. A violation of international law will 
thus always be unconstitutional, and consequently also a breach of their domestic 
legislation. 
 
The major commercial sources of authentic Russian legal texts today that are accessible 
online are all made available mostly in the Russian language. Alternative sources have 
therefore been used, primarily the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, which is a 
law monitor that provides up-to-date information on legal issues affecting NGOs all around 
                                                
 8	  OHCHR	  Summary	  of	  stakeholders	  information,	  2013	  	  9	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  Legal	  Research	  Guide:	  Russia,	  2012	  10	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  Legal	  Research	  Guide:	  Russia,	  2012	  
 8 
the world.11 Their Research Centre was the first to publish an unofficial translation of the 
Foreign Agent Law that has been used in this analysis. The quality of the translation has 
been ensured through supplementing this document with secondary sources confirming its 
content and method of interpretation.  
 
The paper further builds on articles from relevant scholarly journals, various UN 
documents and commentaries, relevant case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights, civil society reports, as well as first hand information gathered through the 
conducted interviews and documentations received from the visited human rights 
organizations. In addition to using legally binding treaties as sources of international law, 
certain non-binding declarations and statements have been applied in order to strengthen 
and emphasize the importance of the arguments and findings. Because the law itself is so 
new and there is a lack of relevant scholarly literature on the topic and on its effect, a big 
portion of the information gathering (especially with regards to current events and 
developments) has been based on newspaper articles collected through various Internet 
sources. Although such sources have high credibility, it is important to keep in mind that 
journalists work under shorter timeframes and are lacking the qualitative control 
mechanisms associated with professional and peer-reviewed articles or journals. More 
importantly, newspapers are placed under lesser demands when it comes to the strive 
towards objectivity. Attempts on increasing their reliability have been made by double-
checking the information stated with other comparable sources.  
 
The choice to visit organizations and talk to their representatives was also considered as the 
most fruitful approach to make up for this shortcoming. Several human rights organizations 
were initially contacted with the assistance from the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and 
their established connections. However, not many had the possibility or time to meet in the 
timeframe that was given. The conducted interviews with Lilia Shibanova (Executive 
Director at Golos) and Furkat Tishaev (Senior Lawyer at Memorial Human Rights 
                                                
 11	  ICNL,	  NGO	  Law	  Monitor,	  2013	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Organization) strengthen the credibility of the findings because of their closeness and 
relation to the topic. Although not high in quantity, these interviews provided an in-depth 
understanding of relevant issues with regards to the law, important knowledge as well as 
documentation, which was of great significance for this study. This includes the 
unpublished English version of the application lodged to the European Court of Human 
Rights on behalf of eleven Russian NGOs - an important document with high credibility 
due to its authoritative status - and the attachments confirming their claimed arguments. It 
should be noted that the government’s perspective and opinion has not been obtained using 
the same approach, since establishing contact with Russian state officials proved to be a 
challenging task. The analysis of this paper has consequently been written with this 
potential weakness of bias in mind.  
 
The following segment provides a short introduction into Russian law governing civil 
society and NGOs. It places the Foreign Agent Law within this legislative framework, and 
furthermore introduces the details of the law in order get familiarised with its content and 
critically assess its implications on civil society organizations.  
 
1.3 Russia’s civil society legislation 
The Russian Constitution confirms the internationally recognized importance of the 
freedom of association in Article 30, and freedom of expression in Article 29.12 The legal 
document states that such organizations are constitutionally prohibited from engaging in 
activity that aims at the alteration of the Constitution or the integrity of the Federation. 
Ratified general principles and norms of international law take precedence over Russian 
domestic law, thus supplementing the constitutional freedom of association and expression 
wit internationally set standards. Finally, we have the Civil Code, which further specifies 
constitutional and international law on the area of NGOs and is the primary legal 
framework regarding civil society. The section on Non-Commercial Organizations (NCOs), 
                                                
 12	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  Art.	  29	  and	  30	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a definition in Russian law that broadly refers to non-profit and nongovernmental 
organizations, defines over 20 various non-profit organizations, their legal status and 
duties. Article 50 gives such on-commercial organizations the right to a legal entity 
status.13 Article 51§1 specifies; “a legal entity shall be subject to state registration with the 
authorized state body in conformity with the procedure, laid down by the Law on 
Registration of Legal Entities. The data on state registration shall be entered to the Unified 
State Register of Legal Entities, which shall be open to the general public”.14  
 
The 1995 Law on Public Associations is the most important Russian legislation to date 
concerning NGOs. A public association is here defined as “a voluntary, self-governing, 
non-profit formation, set up at the initiative of individuals who have united on the basis of 
the community of interests to realize common goals”.15 The law aims at regulating the 
relationship between the authorities and NGOs, more specifically regulating the content of 
their freedom of association and state guarantees thereof, their status, procedures for 
establishment, activity and registration/liquidation. Passed on the same year as this law, the 
Law on Non-Profit Organizations was developed to regulate NGOs, characterized as 
groups formed who do not have profit making, or the distribution of profits among their 
members as their main purpose. Their aim is to reach “social, charitable, cultural, 
educations, scientific and managerial goals, for the purpose of protecting the health of 
citizens (…), protecting the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and organizations 
(…)”.16 This law provides NGO management guidelines, similar to those enumerated in the 
Law on Public Associations. The lack of established NGO governance structure in Russia 
after the democratic transition period provided ample opportunities for fraud and deception 
in the early 1990’s. The transition to a free marked society was fraught with corruption and 
questionable business activities, resulting in disillusionment among citizens and low 
confidence in NGOs. These guidelines were therefore set up as a response to public 
                                                
 13	  Albertie,	  2004	  p.	  17-­‐18	  14	  The	  Civil	  Code	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  Art.	  51§1	  15	  Law	  on	  Public	  Associations,	  Art.	  5	  16	  Law	  on	  Non-­‐Profit	  Organizations,	  Art.	  2§2	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demands that NGOs act legally and ethically. The need to establish their credibility was 
crucial for their survival, and the Law on Non-Profit Associations was created with 
precisely the aim of establishing NGO legitimacy.17  
The Foreign Agent Law introduces amendments to the Law on Public Associations and the 
Law on Non-Profit Organizations, as well as the Criminal Code; and the Law On 
Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. But before we can critically 
examine the implications of these alternations, there is a need to understand the content of 
the law and the regulations that it prescribes. The following section presents the provisions 
of the law and the requirements that they place on politically active NGOs receiving 
funding from sources outside of Russia. 
 
1.3.1 Foreign Agent Law at a glance 
The adopted amendments require any politically active NGO receiving, or intending to 
receive, funding and other property from foreign sources to enter to a special roaster with 
the Russian Ministry of Justice as a “non-commercial organizations performing the 
functions of foreign agents”.18 The law considers an NGO as carrying out political activity 
if, “regardless of its statutory goals an purposes, it participates (including through 
financing) in organizing and implementing political action aimed at influencing the 
decision-making by state bodies intended for the change of state policy pursued by them, as 
well as in shaping public opinion for the aforementioned purposes”.19 If an NGO is 
considered as being engaged in political activity, it is thus compelled to register and mark 
all of its publications and materials, including books, brochures, reports, press-releases, 
official statements, declarations and publications as being produced by an NGO performing 
the functions of a foreign agent.20 The law doesn’t clearly establish the registration 
                                                
 17	  Albertie,	  2004	  p.	  20	  
18	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012,	  Art.	  1§2b	  
19	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012,	  Art.	  2§1	  
20	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012	  Art.	  2§3	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procedure, it mentions only that the process for the inclusion of NGOs into the registry as 
well as its maintenance falls under the responsibilities of the MoJ. It also fails to provide a 
description of how one removes an organization from the roaster.  
 
Annual bookkeeping and financial reports shall be subject to mandatory auditing every 
year, and separate records must be kept of all income and expenses received from foreign 
vs. other sources. The intended use of these resources and their actual use shall be 
documented and submitted to the authorized body on a quarterly basis, while documents 
containing reports on their activities shall be handed in every six months.21 Scheduled 
checks by the authorized body are limited to once a year, while unscheduled checks as a 
result of requests and petitions from citizens or legal entities or mass media reports 
indicating signs of extremism in the activates of the NGO do not have a limitation 
explicitly stated in the law.22  
 
Non-compliance or failure to submit the required information, or any other violation of the 
law by an NGO imposes civil, administrative as well as criminal sanctions and may result 
in extremely harsh financial fines on both the organizations and its private individuals.23 
For instance, if an NGO fails to register as a foreign agent, it faces up to six months of 
suspension of its activities in addition to fines amounting up to 500,000 RUB (USD 
16,240). The managing staff of an NGO may be deprived of their liberty for up to two 
years for the avoidance of entering the registry of Foreign Agents, and a fine in the amount 
of 300,000 RUB, or in the amount of accumulated personal income for the period of the 
last two years.24 The final sanction against an NGO who fails to register as a foreign agent 
after exhausting all their appeals to Court will be liquidation of legal entity, a measure 
                                                
 
21	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012,	  Art.	  2§4b	  
22	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012,	  Art.	  2§4f	  
23	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012,	  Art.	  3-­‐5	  
24	  ICNL	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Agents	  2012,	  Art.	  3-­‐4	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which in not to be found stated anywhere in the law, but which has been voiced by MoJ 
officials in their dialog with NGOs.25  
 
A number of human rights activists and leaders from some of the most prominent NGOs in 
Russia, such as Memorial, Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG), the Interregional Committee 
Against Torture, the Movement for Human Rights, and the Public Verdict Foundation, 
have stated that they have every intention of boycotting the new law, and that they refuse to 
accept the pejorative status of “foreign agent”. Lyudmila Alekseeva, Head of MHG, 
explains that “We do not think of ourselves as foreign agents, and we are not foreign 
agents. We have always been open and honest with our state and with our nation, so we 
find it very offensive that they are trying to label us as some sort of agent and threatening 
us with fines. We receive grants from abroad and spend the money on defending human 
rights – our job is to help people in need, and that is all there is to it”.26  
 
Although the State Duma put the MoJ in charge of monitoring the implementation and 
enforcing these new rules, Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov has not been hiding his 
hesitance towards carrying out the provisions, and actually told the Duma that the law was 
unenforceable the way it stands today.27 He has admitted that there is a lack of certainty as 
to its implementation, and that a body of case law is required in order for the Ministry to be 
able to apply the law more precisely and correctly.28 He specified that the Ministry was 
lacking the jurisdiction to identify the sources of funding or to assess whether NGOs 
activities are “political”.29 Their executive role was therefore for a long time put on hold 
because of the vagueness of the law, and its lack of enforcement. However, in mid-
February 2013, President Putin gave a public speech to officers of the Federal Security 
Service, calling on them to shield Russians from an array of threats, including foreign 
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funded organizations, asserting that no one has a monopoly on speaking in the name of the 
Russian society, “especially structures financed from abroad and serving foreign 
interests”.30 He referred to laws concerning the functions of foreign funded NGOs, and 
stated: “these laws, undoubtedly, should be enforced” 31, consequently encouraging 
concrete action by the Russian authorities in late February/ beginning of March 2013. 
 
1.3.2 Recent enforcements of the law 
A wave of inspections by representatives of the local prosecutors office, departments of 
justice as well as tax authorities was conducted during these months in the offices of 
various NGOs throughout Russia, affecting hundreds of both foreign and domestic 
associations. President Putin has said, “The Prosecutor General’s Office must check the 
legality of actions of all bodies of power – regional, municipal, and also public 
organizations. I think in this case the goal of the inspections is to check how the activities 
of non-governmental organizations comply with their declared objectives, and with the 
laws of Russian Federation”.32 Official documents were presented verifying these check-
ups with the aim of ensuring compliance with the laws of the Russian Federation.  
 
Many of the organizations are regarding these inspections as unlawful by failing to comply 
with several legal pre-conditions. The massive nature of the inspections raises serious 
questions, along with the way they were conducted. In some instances, such as in the case 
of Memorial, journalists from the state-controlled NTV station accompanied the team of 
prosecutors.33 The NGO initially requested an official explanation from the Prosecutors 
Office, after being subject to several onerous check-ups.34 The organization then lodged a 
formal complaint to the Russian court against the actions of the prosecutors, alleging the 
violation of their freedom of association through interrupting their operations and 
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obstructing their work, simultaneously challenging the legality of the prosecutors’ actions. 
They argue that the inspections were not in line with domestic legislation governing the 
officials’ competence, and also challenge their failure to provide reasons for these check-
ups and the notification of the NGOs staff of their rights and procedural safeguards.35 Pavel 
Chikov, a member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, said that the scale of the 
government campaign in unparalleled. “It goes full circle across the whole spectrum. They 
are trying to find as many violations as possible”.36 
 
Subsequently, on the 9th of April 2013, the MoJ informed the election watchdog Golos and 
its executive director Lilia Shibanova that a case is being initiated against them for being in 
breach of the Foreign Agents Law.37 The NGO is thus facing severe fines, and should the 
Court rule in the MoJ’s favour, then the organization will either have to register as a 
“foreign agent” or face further sanctions under the law. On the 16th of April, the New York 
Times also wrote about another organization falling under the provisions of the law, called 
the Kostroma Center for the Defense of Public Initiatives38, closely followed by Memorial 
later the same month.39 The most recent enforcements were announced on the 8th of May 
2013, where three more NGOs were branded as foreign agents, namely the Moscow School 
of Political Studies, the Ural Human Rights Group and Public Verdict Human Rights 
Foundation.40 
 
The investigations and the cases filed against organizations being in breach of the law are 
confirming the concerns raised by the NGO community when the law entered into force. 
Many believed that the law was in fact created with the intention of targeting Golos, 
including the organization themselves, therefore predicting that the enforcement would fit 
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them first.41 The following chapter places the law within the overall Russian civil society 
legislation, and mentions other regulations that have been in the spotlight because of the 
restrictive influence they have on the freedom of association and expression in Russia. This 
is important in order to grasp the broader trend and continuity of the restrictions that the 
authorities are placing on the NGO society, and also to acknowledge the cumulative effects 
of these measures have on their operational space. 
 
2 Russia’s interference with civil society organizations 
Numerous laws have been passed in the last decade bearing hallmarks of state interference 
and curtailment of the freedom of association and expression in the Russian Federation. 
Some of these restrictions are a direct result of the laws that govern the activities of civil 
society, while others are a result of lengthy and vague “catch-all” definitions used in other 
legislative frameworks that have been applied to the work of human rights organizations. 
The 2002 Federal Law on the Counteraction of Extremist Activity for instance, has a broad 
definition of what such activity entails, and continues to be enlarges until this day, 
providing wide discretion to the authorities on its application.42 NGOs that work on human 
rights, are politically active, and that express or mobilize dissent are thus vulnerable to 
being targeted under the law, which as a result has been labelled as an “invitation to abuse” 
through a tightening of registration and liquidation procedures and arbitrary application.43  
 
The 2006 Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation (the 2006 Russian NGO Law) establishes burdensome registering and reporting 
requirements for NGOs, consequently contributing to having an administrative choking 
effect on the organizations. This law targets foreign funded NGOs in particular, and has 
been heavily criticized by various international NGOs as seriously undermining the work 
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of human rights NGOs by burying them with reporting procedures and unnecessary 
administrative tasks.44 This law in particular will be addressed more in detail in section 2.1. 
 
In the period between June and July 2012, the state Duma adopted an additional set of laws 
that further restrict civil rights in Russia. These initiatives include, among others, the law 
on increasing sanctions for violation of rules governing assemblies (the so-called “protest 
law”), the law on the criminalization of defamation45, and the recent Law on Foreign 
Agents. Many believe that these recent legislative measures have been adopted as a 
response to the wide scale protest campaigns and demonstrations against the authorities, 
which took place after the public revelations of electoral fraud in both the Parliamentary 
elections held on December 4th 2011, and the Presidential elections which took place on 4th 
of March 2012, conducted by the electoral surveillance organization Golos.46  
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) pointed in their Resolution 
1896 on “The honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation”, 
dated 2 October 2012, towards the worrying legislative trends that have recently emerged 
in the country, calling the Russian authorities’ real intention into question.47 Various 
stakeholders in Russia’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) summary report expressed 
concerns regarding the country’s civil society legislation and their overall situation on 
human rights defenders. It was stated that NGOs and HRD faced both legal and 
administrative hindrances in their work, as well as government-stoked hostility. There were 
reports of HRD facing harassment and intimidation and even physical violence. Many 
pointed to the fact that arbitrary and discriminatory application of legislation in all stages of 
creation and functioning of NGOs was an on-going problem, much because of the 
qualitative inadequacies in the wording of the laws.48  
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The 2012 amendments forces organizations to register as foreign agents when seeking and 
obtaining money from abroad. Their right to seek and secure resources is subsequently 
affected because of the implications that are attached with such a label. Russia’s distrust 
towards foreign money and the restrictions that are being placed on NGO funding can be 
explained with reference to the American foreign policy of democratization both before 
and after the fall of the Soviet Union. Many governments were publicly denouncing 
Western democracy assistance to civil society organizations as illegitimate political 
meddling after decades of democracy building programs were introduced by the US around 
the world. Some started expelling or harassing Western NGOs and also prohibiting local 
groups and associations from obtaining foreign funds – or have started to punish them for 
doing so. Autocratic regimes have won public sympathy by arguing that these measures are 
not implemented as resistance to democracy itself, but rather as a step to halt American 
interventionism.49 Nowhere in the world can this political rhetoric have more force and 
influence than in the post-Soviet countries. Putin’s offence against Western democracy and 
civil society aid through the establishment of administrative and legal funding barriers for 
NGOs is thus rationalized a defence of the country’s national security from “foreign 
intervention” and political meddling. This way of explaining this ‘protection’ is 
consequently both logical and effective for the overall Russian population.  
 
This distrust towards foreign funded NGOs in particular was first formed into state policy 
with the amendments introduced in the 2006 Russian NGO law. The governments’ way of 
regulating NGOs has been very much in the spotlight since its implementation. This 
following section therefore presents the already existing financial reporting regulations that 
were in place before the adoption of the Foreign Agents Law, which is significant when 
determining the necessity of introducing these 2012 amendments, especially with regards 
to the proportionality assessment.  
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2.1 The 2006 Russian NGO Law 
The 2006 NGO law has been heavily criticized by the international NGO community for 
establishing burdensome administrative procedures particularly for foreign, but also 
domestic NGOs. It provided new broad powers of the registration bodies to audit the 
activities of the organizations, added new and frequent reporting requirements 
accompanied by severe penalties for non-compliance or wrongful or incomplete 
applications. The law has raised special concerns because of the excessive obligations and 
the broad discretion accorded to state officials to interfere with the founding and operation 
of NGOs. Many have pointed to the fact that these traits open up for discriminatory and 
arbitrary misuse and can have a harmful impact on the work of human rights NGOs.50 
 
The Kremlin has not tried to hide the fact that the aim of this law was to control and 
monitor foreign funding of NGOs in particular, by offering more transparency and 
accountability through new reporting requirements relating to any foreign income sources. 
At the time of the approval of these regulations, Putin commented that “the government 
will support non-commercial organizations, but shall see to it that their funding is 
transparent, which should guarantee their independence; otherwise they would dance to the 
tune of their foreign puppeteers”.51 On international funding of NGOs in general, he stated 
that “I can say – and I think that it is clear for all – that when these nongovernmental 
organizations are financed by foreign governments, we see them as an instrument that 
foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies”.52 The law is supposed to “prevent the 
intrusion of foreign states into Russia’s internal political life and at creating favourable and 
transparent conditions for the financing of NGOs”.53  
 
The regulatory barriers that have received negative attention relating to the 2006 NGO law 
and foreign funded NGOs are not a direct result of the legal provisions per se, but more as a 
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result of the selective application of law.54 This is made possible due to the broad and 
excessive powers given to the registration authorities, together with the vague language and 
unclear guidelines of the law. In its 2009 report, the Expert Council on NGO Law – a body 
created under the auspices of the Council of Europe Conference of International NGOs to 
evaluate the conformity of member states’ NGO-related laws and practices with Council of 
Europe standards – criticized various aspects of Russia’s NGO regime, concluding that it 
has a number of incompatibilities with the notion of a desirable flexible regime governing 
the acquisition of legal personality or registration, and that the overall NGO legislation 
needs reform.55  
 
The prevention of foreign money from entering the country is also ensured through other 
decrees and rules, further limiting the prospects for NGOs to receive grants from national 
and international donors, which will be addressed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 below. 
 
2.2 Unfavourable tax law 
Foreign or international organizations wishing to make tax-exempt grants to Russian NGOs 
must be on a approved donor list created by the Russian government, which was reduced in 
size by Decree #485 adopted on June 28th 2008, shrinking the number of approved 
international foundations from 101 to merely 12.56 This new rule put in jeopardy tens of 
millions of US dollars of grants to NGOs operating in Russia, and some of the donors that 
didn’t make the list included the Global Fund to fight AIDS, the MacArthur Foundation, 
the Ford Foundation, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies among others – all highly respected and credible international funds. Under these 
new rules, NGOs receiving grants from donors that were not on the list were required to 
pay a 24 per cent tax on “profits”, a provision which contravenes the 2007 recommendation 
of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on the legal status of non-governmental 
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organizations, a nonbinding document which states that “NGOs should be assisted in the 
pursuit of their objectives through public funding and other forms of support, such as 
exemption from income and other taxes”.57 In September 2012, Russian authorities also 
ended the activities of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
Russia altogether by expelling the organization, claiming that their programs undermined 
Russia’s sovereignty and interfered in their politics.58 
 
2.3 Limited governmental funding 
Government funding is very limited in Russia and it is especially difficult for human rights 
organizations to obtain the small amount of grants that are available, much because they 
take on the role of criticizing the government. Before signing the law, on July 10 the 
President promised a threefold increase in domestic finding for Russian NGOs.59 The 
authorities did in fact create a couple of their own programs for financing civil society 
organizations, but their procedure has proven to be quite doubtful and it seems as though 
there are always some unknown, pro-governmental NGOs that are receiving the grants.60 
The Golos organization has for instance applied for grants awarded by the Russian 
government on several occasions, but has been consistently refused, while private Russian 
companies are afraid to offer it open support.61  
 
Finding sponsors among private individuals or businesses in Russia is also challenging, 
especially since the arrest of the former Yukos Chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003. 
Many believe that his imprisonment was orchestrated because of his funding of opposition 
groups, politicians and democracy activists, consequently creating fear among individuals 
wishing to finance any opponent of the government.62 And since the present Russian tax 
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law strongly discourages private philanthropy and there are no significant Russian funds, 
this leaves many NGOs heavily dependent on foreign donors in order to survive. When 
national access to funding is so limited and difficult to obtain for NGOs that criticize the 
government, and the attainment of foreign funds is accompanied with a pejorative tag that 
hinders NGOs to operating efficiently, to what degree is the freedom of association really 
then protected? What alternatives do these organizations have if they want to keep their 
legal entity status and operate efficiently? Access to funding forms an integral part of the 
right to freedom of association as is argued below, and if funding restrictions stifle the 
organizations’ ability to pursue their goals or in any way prevents them from carrying our 
their activities effectively, they then represent unwarranted interference with this particular 
right. The Foreign Agents Law consequently not only discourages the organizations from 
seeking foreign funding, but ultimately also threatens their existence because of the lack of 
alternative solutions.  
 
Having established the content of the law along with the social context in which it has 
arisen, the following chapter seeks to clarify the existing international human rights 
standards that protect individuals to form, join and participate in civil society organizations, 
namely freedom of association and expression. It also seeks to describe the limitation 
clauses that provide guidelines on what constitutes legitimate state interference, in order to 
be able to determine to what degree the provisions of the law are fulfilling the required 
criteria. The chapter also establishes the importance of right to access funding both as a 
self-standing right, and as an integral part of freedom of association for NGOs.  
 
3 International rules protecting civil society 
The right to freedom of association is widely recognized as a fundamental right in a 
democratic society, in fact, one of the foundations of such a society. The Human Rights 
Council (HRC) has recognized in their Resolution 15/21 that this right is indispensable to 
the full enjoyment of other human rights, and should be free of restrictions and subject only 
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to limitations permitted by international human rights law, particularly where individuals 
may espouse dissenting political beliefs.63 The resolution also encourages NGOs to 
promote the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association, recognizing that civil society 
facilitates the achievement of the aims and principles of the UN. The right to associate 
freely is repeatedly connected with the freedom of expression, both of which are 
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)64 and also protected by 
the major international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)65, the ECHR66, and a substantial list of other human rights conventions and 
declarations.67 Although the treaties contain virtually identical guarantees, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been far more active in developing the exact content 
and scope of that right derived from relevant case law.68 Russia became a state party to the 
ECHR in 1998 by virtue of their ratification.69 The decisions made by the Court, which are 
final and not subject to any review, are of global significance since Article 10 and 11 of the 
ECHR protecting freedom of expression and association are essentially the same as article 
19 and 22 of the ICCPR, a convention that has been ratified by 140 nations, including the 
Russian Federation.70 The European Convention and the practice of the Court will therefore 
be the primary sources used with regards to these rules and their interpretation, which also 
take precedence over Russian domestic law.  
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3.1 Freedom of association 
The freedom of association is a fundamental human right involving the right of individuals 
to interact and organize themselves to collectively express, promote, pursue and defend 
common interest and values. It is protected in Article 30 of the Russian Constitution as well 
as in the various human rights treaties mentioned above. The ECtHR has noted that “where 
a civil society functions in a healthy manner, the participation of citizens in the democratic 
process is to a large extent achieved through belonging to associations in which they may 
integrate with each other and pursue common objectives collectively”.71  
 
3.1.1 The scope of the right 
Article 11 of the ECHR stipulates that everyone has the right to peaceful assembly, and to 
the freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions.72 
This right, however, is not absolute, and any permissible grounds for restriction on the 
exercise thereof are prescribed by the limitation clause 11§2, which limits the restrictions 
to those which are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health and morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
(…)”.73 
 
Association within the meaning of this article could be defined as any form of voluntary 
grouping for a common goal. Despite the fact that Article 11 of the Convention expressly 
enumerates only one type of association, i.e. trade unions, it does not exclude in its 
definition other forms of voluntary assemblies. The definition in fact reveals that the Court 
interprets the term very broadly, including religious organizations, employer association 
                                                
 71	  Gorzelik	  and	  others	  v.	  Poland,	  §92	  72	  ECHR,	  Art.	  11	  §	  1	  73	  ECHR,	  Art.	  11	  §	  2	  
 25 
and various other forms of voluntary groupings gathered for a common goal, such as non-
governmental organizations.74  
 
The freedom of association is not dependent on any legal entity status, since the law 
includes the possibility to associate informally, without the requirement of registering with 
the state authorities.75 In some instances it may be enough to rely solely on the individual 
legal capacities of those who wish to found the NGO in order to pursue the organizations 
objectives. In practice, however, the pursuit of those goals is usually something more 
readily and easily undertaken through endowing the organization concerned with a legal 
personality that is distinct from that of its founders or the members belonging to the 
organization. It is often through the registration process that NGOs are able to act with the 
advantages that such a legal personality may afford, such as the having access to tax 
preferences, right to enter contracts, the ability to conclude transactions for goods and 
services, hire staff, open a bank accounts, etc.  
 
In the Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece case, the ECtHR has held that the ability to form a 
legal entity in order to act collectively is one of the most important aspects of the right to 
freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning.76 It is 
therefore essential that there is a possibility under the law to acquire legal entity status for 
groups that so desire. In those countries where states have employed a registration system, 
it is their responsibility to guarantee that the process is easily accessible, with clear and 
quick, apolitical and inexpensive procedures in place.77 Once formed, NGOs have the right 
to operate in an enabling environment, free from unjustifiable state intrusion or interference 
in their activities and affairs. As Mr Tishaev stated in his interview, “the possibility of not 
registering as a legal entity is really not an option for us because of the strong commitments 
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that we have towards our funders”.78 The requirement of reporting on how the money that 
the organization has received is being spent is a necessity in any legitimate international 
foundation, and this whole process would probably not be possible without the obtainment 
of a legal status at the national level. This is important because it leaves no other option for 
foreign funded human rights organizations that wish to operate with their legal entity 
status, than to declare themselves as foreign agents under this law. Their working 
efficiency is therefore dependent on the registration. 
 
3.1.2 The content of the right 
The content of the freedom of association protects 1) the aims of the associations, 2) guards 
against interference by the State with the right to form or join already existing 
organizations, 3) forbids unjustified prohibition or dismissal of an association and also 3) 
declares their right to autonomously regulate their internal structure.79  
 
Article 11 suggests the right of an association to undertake any activity with the view of 
achieving any legal aim and pursue a broad range of lawful objectives. The State cannot 
deny such freedom by simply rendering the aims of an organization as illegal or banned.80 
One of the features of a democratic society is pluralism, and so the banning of an NGO 
based on their views, which are contrary to the majority parties in that society cannot be 
justified. Associations, including NGOs, should be able to campaign for a change in the 
law or in the legal and constitutional structures of the State, provided that the means used 
for this purpose are lawful and democratic, and that the change itself is compatible with 
fundamental democratic principles.81 Human rights work is characterised by its efforts to 
make governments comply with internationally set human right standards in the field of 
both civil, political, economical, cultural and social rights. In some situations this might 
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entail advocating for a political change. In the case of United Communist Party of Turkey 
and Others v. Turkey, the Court concluded that an association or a political party shall not 
be denied their freedom of association and the protection that this right entails simply 
because the authorities consider these acts to be constituting the deterioration of the 
constitutional order. This is important with regards to the Foreign Agents Law, as the 
amendments require the organizations to register as foreign agents if they perform political 
activities aimed at influencing the decision-making by state bodies intended for the change 
of state policy pursued by them, as well as in shaping public opinion for the 
aforementioned purposes.82 The issues and implications with regards to using such a 
criterion in the wording of the law will be discussed more in detail in section 5.2.2.  
 
Given that the implementation of the principle of pluralism, which is essential in a well 
functioning democracy is impossible without an organization being able to freely express 
and distribute their ideas, findings and opinions, the ECtHR has also recognized that 
Article 10 of the Convention regarding freedom of expression is one of the objectives of 
the freedom of association as enshrined in Art. 11.83 This is particularly relevant for NGOs 
because of their role as government “watchdogs”, which involves imparting information, 
ideas and findings on all matters of public interest thus contributing to the transparency of 
the actions of public authorities.84 This link between these rights is also important since 
many believe that the Foreign Agents Law was introduced, at least in part, in reaction to 
the organizations’ views and statements.85 The Court has in its practise established that a 
case can be examined under Art.11, and in a case of a violation of that provision conclude 
that no separate issue arose under Art.10 since Art. 11 is lex specialis.86 If the Foreign 
Agents Law proves to be an unjustifiable restriction on the freedom of association, this will 
naturally also touch upon the organizations’ freedom of expression as well.  
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3.2 Freedom of expression 
Article 29 of the Russian Constitution states that everyone shall be guaranteed the freedoms 
of ideas and speech, and have the right to freely look for, receive, transmit, produce and 
distribute information by any legal way. Article 10 of the ECHR states that everyone has 
the freedom to hold opinions and receive impartial information and ideas without 
interference by a public authority, and regardless of any boundaries. However, because 
such a freedom carries with it duties and responsibilities towards other members of society, 
limitations are allowed in the name of “national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.87 
These restrictions must also be prescribed by law, and necessary in a democratic society.  
 
In Stankov and the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden v. Bulgaria, the Court held 
that: “Freedom of assembly and the right to express one’s views through it are among the 
paramount values of a democratic society. The essence of democracy is its capacity to 
resolve problems through open debate. Sweeping measures of a preventive nature to 
suppress freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence 
or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain views or 
words used may appear to the authorities, and however illegitimate the demands made may 
be – do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it. In a democratic society based 
on the rule of law, political ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realization 
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression 
through the exercise of the right of assembly as well as by other lawful means.”88 The 
Court has also stated that: “An organization may campaign for a change in the legal and 
constitutional structures of the State if the means used to that end are in every respect legal 
and democratic and if the change proposed is itself compatible with fundamental 
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democratic principles”.89  
 
As previously mentioned, the freedom of association and expression can be subject to 
certain restraints for the protection of a bigger cause, as long as these restrictions are 
constructed according to their limitation clauses. This next section explains the criteria that 
need to be fulfilled in order for an interference to be legitimate, and elaborates on their 
application. 
 
3.3 Criteria for legitimate interference as prescribed in Article 11 and 10 
The State authorities can interfere with both freedoms as long as these regulations are 
“prescribed by law”, “in pursuit of a legitimate aim” and “necessary in a democratic 
society”.90 All of these conditions must be fulfilled cumulatively, meaning that if one of the 
criteria’s is not fulfilled, the restriction is unlawful and the Russian authorities are 
consequently violating their international obligations. The first step is to establish whether 
there has been interference, and if so, whether it was legitimately justified. This includes an 
examination of whether the restriction was proportional to the legitimate aim pursued.91 
This section attempts to clarify the meaning of these steps and principles, which will later 
be applied when evaluating the Foreign Agent Law.  
 
3.3.1 What constitutes interference? 
A government can restrict an individuals right to association in various ways, including 
deleting an association from the public register, prohibit an organization from undertaking 
certain activities, penalize its members, refuse registration, prohibit individuals to join an 
association, or force him/her to leave etc. These are all rather direct restrictions placed on 
the NGOs or their members. In general, there is rarely a problem with determining whether 
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or not there has been a limitation of the right, since States most often admit to having 
interfered and focus instead on their arguments proving that such interference was in fact 
justified.92 Issues arise when the interference is of a more indirect nature – such as an 
aftereffect of the requirements stipulated in the law. The Russian authorities are claiming to 
have acted rightfully when articulating the Foreign Agent Law, while the associations 
affected argue that their freedom of association has been restricted by a damaged 
reputation, making it difficult for them to operate effectively in society. 
 
3.3.2 First criterion: Prescribed by law 
It is not sufficient that the State has a formal legal source allowing interference; it also has 
to contain certain qualitative characteristics. This “prescribed by law” criterion aims to 
ensure compliance with the principle of legal certainty and foreseeability. The domestic 
regulations have to be accessible, and its provisions formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the person or association concerned to foresee the implications and consequences, 
which a given action may entail. Complete precision is not necessary, which would exclude 
the needed interpretation in the application of the laws, but certain level of foreseeability is 
required.93 In order for domestic law to meet these demands it must afford a measure of 
legal protection against arbitrary use in order to avoid unfettered power being granted to 
the executive, which would be contrary to the rule of law - one of the basic principles of a 
democratic society.94  
 
3.3.3 Second criterion: In pursuit of a legitimate aim 
Freedom of association may be restricted only a) in the interest of national security or 
public safety, b) for the prevention of disorder or crime, c) for the protection of health and 
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morals, and d) for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.95 In order to avoid 
any potential abuse of the broadness of these terms, the Court has established that they are 
to be interpreted narrowly, and should not be broadened beyond their usual meaning. As a 
response to concerns that the limitation clauses in the ICCPR (which are identical to those 
in the ECHR) were interpreted and applied in a manner that was not consistent with the 
purposes of the Convention, the UN Economic and Social Council adopted a non-binding 
international treaty in 1984 called “Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”. Though not legally 
binding, these principles articulate some general interpretive criteria relating to the 
justifications of the limitations, adopted by a group of international human rights experts in 
May 1984.96 These interpretations indicate that the aims are understood very strictly. The 
notion “national security” for instance, only justifies the measures that limit certain rights 
when they are taken to protect the mere existence of the nation, its territorial integrity or 
political independence against any threat of force.97 No restrictions can be placed simply to 
prevent isolated threats to law and order. “Public safety” on the other hand, means 
“protection against danger to the safety of persons, to their life or physical integrity, or 
serious damage to their property”.98  
 
3.3.4 Third criterion: Necessary in a democratic society 
In order for a measure limiting the freedom of association to be regarded as necessary, it 
must be aimed at achieving one of the abovementioned legitimate aims.99 The term 
“necessary” must here be understood in the context of a democratic society, and the 
characteristics that are crucial for its well function, such as pluralism, tolerance, open-
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mindedness, equality and freedom. A measure is seen as proportionate, and therefore also 
necessary, if it fulfils a “pressing social need” and does not restrict the freedom more than 
absolutely required in the interest of the pursued aim.100 The State party must also 
demonstrate that the restriction is needed in order to avert real and not hypothetical dangers 
to national security or democratic order, and that less intrusive measures would not 
suffice.101 
 
This is a proportionality test in a strict sense, where one evaluates whether the measure was 
proportional to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved. This entails a balancing test that 
requires an appropriate relationship between the benefits that are gained by restricting a 
right versus the societal harm caused by the limitation. An evaluation of the importance of 
the right in its social context, the extent of the limitation, its intensity, dimension and 
probability must be considered on the on side of the scale. On the other side, we would 
have the importance of the goal in view of its content, the urgency of its realization 
reflected in the harm that would be caused absent the restriction, and the probability of that 
harm.102 Although such balancing is a daunting task, and the principle of proportionality 
has its critics, it helps to structure the mind of the balancer and identifies certain critical 
measures that have to be taken in consideration when determining whether the measures 
taken by the State can be said to be necessary in its societal context.  
 
According to the HRC, the reference to the notion of “democratic society” indicates that 
the existence of civil society organizations is a cornerstone of a democracy, even (and 
maybe even more so) if they promote ideas not necessarily favourable to the government or 
the majority of the population.103 However, what constitutes a justifiable restriction on a 
human right varies from society to society, depending on its unique challenges, history, and 
self-perception. The importance of a right and the importance of preventing its limitation 
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are therefore determined according to a society’s unique character, and its fundamental 
perceptions.104 Given the direct contact that the governments have with the processes that 
are forming their country, they are in a much better position to assess the need of the 
regulation. The state authorities are therefore left with something called “the margin of 
appreciation”. This discretion has been perceived as quite broad in the European Court’s 
practise, however, it is not unlimited and its scope depends on the circumstances of the 
case, the nature of the legitimate aim pursued as well as the intensity of the interference.105 
The ECtHR has stressed that this discretion goes hand in hand with a European 
supervision, where the Court is thus empowered to give the final ruling on whether the 
restriction is legitimate.106 
 
Because the source of the alleged interference is directly related to the funding routines of 
NGOs, the following section establishes the importance of the organizations’ right to seek 
and secure resources both as a self-standing right, but more importantly as a vital 
component of their freedom of association.  
 
3.4 The right to seek and secure resources 
Since various NGOs and human rights organizations generally function on the “not-for-
profit” principle, they are naturally and consequently heavily dependent on sources of 
funding in order to carry out their work. This necessity has been codified as a self-standing 
right in in the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and 
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, commonly known as Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 
(DHRD), adopted by the General Assembly in 1998, and also as an integral part of the 
freedom of association. The solicitation of income therefore becomes a very important 
aspect and a crucial part of NGOs independence.  
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3.4.1 Right to secure resources as a self-standing right 
The HRD Declaration refers to “individuals, groups and associations (…) contributing to 
(…) the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of peoples and individuals” as human rights defenders.107 This broad categorization 
encompasses both large intergovernmental organizations as well as individuals in local 
communities working towards the promotion and protection of human rights. Rather than 
using a specific description of who a HRD is, the term describes the work that they 
preform, which may be; collecting and disseminating information on violations, support 
victims of human rights violations, work toward securing accountability and the end of 
impunity, support better governance and government policy, contribute to the 
implementation of human rights treaties or undertake human rights education and 
training.108 Consequently, these activities and requirements are applicable to the work and 
activities conducted by local, national and international NGOs. 
 
Despite the fact that the DHRD is not a legally binding text, it provides a normative 
framework for the protection of HRD and also represents a strong political commitment by 
all UN member States to respect the principles encoded in the document. Article 13 of the 
Declaration states: “Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to 
solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and protecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with 
Article 3 of the present Declaration”.109 States are thus under the obligation to permit both 
individuals and organizations to “solicit, receive and utilize resources”, a wording that 
covers all the phases connected to the cycle of funding. 110 With this in mind, States must 
adopt a legislative and administrative framework that does not impede any of these stages 
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of funding, whether these have been obtained nationally or internationally.  
 
States may justify legislation that restricts the access to funding on the basis of the 
reference to domestic law. The Special Rapporteur on HRD has however clarified that this 
provision must be read together with Article 4, specifying that domestic legislation is 
dependent on being in accordance with international human rights law in order for it to 
provide the framework within which defenders carry out their activities, thus having many 
of the same limitation standards as freedom of association.111  
 
These commitments emphasize the importance of a legislative and administrative 
framework that does not impede the solicitation of sources for NGOs, and provide strong 
indicators for the seriousness of such interference. This next section affords these 
guarantees a degree of authority, by establishing the right to seek and secure resources as a 
part of NGOs freedom of association. 
 
3.4.2 Access to funding as an integral part of the freedom of association 
Freedom of association entails duties containing both positive and negative obligations. 
Governments should not only refrain from unlawfully interfering with the creation of 
associations, but also encourage participation and create an enabling environment for all 
NGOs to operate freely and without any unnecessary legal, administrative or operational 
hindrance. If freedom of association is a formally recognized and protected right, but 
individuals and organizations are denied the resources, or placed under funding restrictions 
in a way that makes it difficult for them to pursue their objectives as an association, then 
this right cannot be considered to be effectively implemented and protected.112 The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association, Maina Kiai, stressed that, 
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“without the ability to access funding, from sources local, regional or international, this 
right becomes void”.113  
 
Authoritative support to such an interpretation can be found among observations and 
statements issued by various UN treaty-monitoring bodies. In the October 2004 Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General on human rights defenders Hina Jilani, 
which is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Declaration, included 
“restrictions on funding” as a category of legal impediments used by governments, which 
seriously affect the ability of human rights defenders to carry out their activities.114 The 
Special Representative recommended that governments must allow access by NGOs to all 
funding, including foreign funding, as a part of international cooperation, to which civil 
society is entitled to, and to a large extent dependent on. The only legitimate requirements 
placed on NGOs should thus be those in the interest of transparency.115 To what extent this 
is the actual aim of the Foreign Agents Law will be discussed when analyzing its 
legitimacy in chapter 5.  
 
By forcing organizations to register as foreign agents because of their obtainment of 
funding from abroad, the NGO’s right to seek and secure resources and consequently their 
freedom of associations are no longer entitlements that are properly protected because of 
the implications that accompany such a term. Having established that the law touches upon 
these freedoms, there is a demand take into consideration the governments’ justifications 
for introducing the amendments in order to fairly determine the legitimacy and rightfulness 
of the law. As previously mentioned, the national authorities do have a margin of discretion 
when creating domestic legislation since they are in the best position to assess the need and 
necessity of the restriction.116 The State must thus demonstrate that it exercised its 
discretion reasonably, and that their justifications are relevant and sufficient.  
                                                
 113	  Kiai,	  2012	  114	  Jilani,	  2004	  p.	  20	  115	  Jilani,	  2004	  p.	  22	  116	  Mataga	  2006.	  p.	  18	  
 37 
4 Government justifications for introducing amendments 
The Russian authorities have viewed foreign funded NGOs as threats to the national 
security and national sovereignty of the Russian Federation. Stricter regulatory control is 
explained with the need for supervisory oversight of their activities, prevent interference in 
the affairs of the state and to protect against attempts to exercise foreign influence through 
the funding of politically active human rights organizations from abroad.117 Indeed, the fact 
that human rights NGOs have positioned themselves as very influential and powerful 
actors, which deal with morally infused principles, does create a need to investigate and 
regulate their conduct quite urgent. Responsibility must be attached to their increasingly 
prominent role in society. NGOs authority is informal, and it stems from cultural sources 
that are capable of “triggering powerful logistics of compulsion that are masked by the 
theory of rational voluntarism”.118 The legal authority of such organizations is therefore not 
controlled or limited in any way. Rather, their authority flows from elemental principles of 
morality, voluntarism and individual action119 – all of which are potentially subject to 
abuse. One must therefore understand the governments need to create laws that ensure 
transparency, objectivity and accurate reporting.  
 
Using human rights organizations as a front for political objectives are not recent or 
unknown developments either. Throughout history, there have been incidents of attempted 
political influence through the funding of civil society organizations operating abroad.  For 
instance, the New York Times conveyed in 1967 that the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) had secretly funded several “anti communist NGOs” during their ideological 
struggle, and governments have on many later occasions levelled charges of bias and 
politicization against supposedly independent NGOs. The potential for such alignment is in 
fact real, especially given that the industry is not subject to any formal regulation. Some 
point to the fact that human rights organizations base their actions on the unimpeachable 
and high moral principles of human rights, which provides these NGOs with a level of 
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incontrovertibility as to intent and motive that is simply without parallel.120 Such a “shield” 
is most certainly open to abuse. There exists a possibility that human rights organizations 
are being established to advance politicized objectives that are held by their financial 
backers or funders, and the public at large is ill informed regarding the sources of their 
income. The question remains whether such concerns are realistic and urgent in the Russian 
context, and whether the authorities can demonstrate that the adoption of the law was a 
response to an imminent threat of such intentional foreign influence. 
 
The Kremlin has thus justified the Foreign Agents Law on the need for organizational 
transparency and objectivity achieved through scrutinizing foreign funded NGOs. The law 
is therefore claimed to be an instrument of openness. Civil society organization receiving 
grants from outside the country have been viewed with intense suspicion in Russia since 
the so-called “colour revolutions” in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, where the 
public uprisings that overthrew the governments were perceived as driven by foreign 
funded NGOs.121 These incidents manifested in the eyes of the Russian authorities the 
possibility of public uprising brought about by such actors, thus further establishing the 
need for stricter regulation.122 Aleksandr Sidyakin, a United Russia deputy and the co-
author of the law, has expressed the following in his blog; “The ultimate goal of funding 
non-profit organizations, as a form of soft power, is a colored revolution (…). This is not a 
myth of government propaganda it is objective political reality. The United States is trying 
to affect Russian politics”.123 
 
Irina Yarova, who chairs the lower house of parliament’s security and heads the pro-
Kremlin party’s conservative wing, has stated that the bill was fully in line with 
international democratic standards, and that its aim is to protect the interests of civil 
society. It is an “instrument of openness that threatens no one”, and “Russians must be able 
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to understand who in the country does political work paid with foreign money. That’s a 
standard of international democracy”, she claims.124 Federation Council speaker Valentina 
Matvienko has publicly voiced her support for the law, explaining in an interview with RIA 
Novosoti, the Russian International News Agency, that “the necessity of the law is obvious 
because any state is obliged to defend its national interests from foreign influence”.125 In 
similar wording, vice-speaker of the State Duma Sergei Zheleznyak has explained that 
registration is desirable “because it is unclear in whose interest and on whose dime these 
NGOs were operating”.126 Mr Sidyakin doesn’t hide the fact that the amendments were 
introduced in order to counter what he calls attempts by the United States to “affect 
Russian politics”. He singles out the independent election monitor Golos as an example, 
arguing that they received 2 million dollars in 2011 in order to “dirty the Russian 
authorities”. The author is stressing that the registrations will “by no means interfere with 
NGO activities”, and believes that there is nothing insulting in the term “foreign agent”.127  
 
Many of the non-Russian organizations that regularly support Russian NGOs are highly 
respected, credible and well-known foundations that provide open and transparent 
processes when providing grant funding, including the European Commission, USAID, the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, the Council of Europe, carious UN institutions, Ford 
Foundation, Swedish International Development cooperation Agency (SIDA), the 
MacArthur Foundation, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED), to mention a few.128 Suggesting that organizations like these have 
any hidden political agendas, which are hostile to Russia’s interests shows a genuine 
misunderstanding of the goals and aims of both the sponsors and the NGOs. Neither have 
there been any recent, concrete incidents that could in other ways justify these accusations. 
The Russian authorities are thus making a strong case for the necessity of the Foreign 
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Agents Law, but are failing to substantiate their motivations with concrete evidence that 
would demonstrate the urgency with adopting such regulations. The clarity of the law, its 
motive and need will be subject to scrutiny and a proportionality assessment in the 
following chapter.   
 
5 Analysis of the legitimacy of the Foreign Agent Law 
This chapter seeks to examine the legitimacy of the Foreign Agents Law by taking use of 
the criteria that justify interference with freedom of association and expression as stipulated 
in the European Convention; hereunder “prescribed by law”, “in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim” and “necessary in a democratic society”. But before turning to such an assessment, 
the first part of this chapter will discuss how and why the foreign agent label is affecting 
the work of these organizations, in order to establish whether there is in fact an interference 
with these rights.  
 
5.1 The implications of the ‘foreign agent’ self-denomination 
The NGO community in Russia is claiming that the interference with their freedom of 
association and expression is, among others, a consequence of the self-denomination 
requirement that the law places on them.129 A linguistic report undertaken by the Institute 
of the Russian Language by the Russian Academy of Sciences (IRL RAS) has found that 
the term “agent” has three principal definitions in the contemporary Russian language; 1) 
the representative of an organization, 2) someone acting in the interests of another, and 3) a 
spy. This term taken together with the word “foreign” has strong and persistent 
connotations among the majority of Russian native speakers as being someone acting in the 
interest of a foreign and necessarily hostile state/organization.130  
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The abovementioned connotations can be explained in historical terms. The Russian 
authorities and investigative bodies repeatedly used phrase “foreign agent” as a standard 
accusation against large numbers of Russian citizens during the political repression of the 
1930’s and 1940’s. The notion therefore entered the consciousness of native Russian 
speakers as a politically loaded term, associated with the critical speeches of Soviet public 
prosecutors, in court sentences and extra-judicial decisions, and on the pages of Soviet 
newspapers.131 These findings are also supported by a public opinion toll conducted by 
Levada Analytical Centre, a Russian non-governmental research organization, which 
regularly conducts sociological surveys.  69% of the overall respondents of the opinion toll 
perceived the term negatively, accordingly validating the findings of the linguistic report as 
well. 39%, which was the highest percentage, understood the wording as meaning a spy, 
secret service agent of a foreign state, or a secret service agent acting undercover. 22% of 
the respondents answered that for them, a “foreign agent” meant a masked enemy acting 
inside Russia in the interest of other countries, a so-called traitor. Only 18% had a more 
neutral understanding of the wording, and understood it as meaning a representative of a 
foreign state or organization.132 These findings indicate that the arguments presented by the 
state authorities regarding the neutrality of the terminology are inadequate, since it can be 
verified that the majority of the Russian public has negative associations with such a label. 
The historical understanding and cultural context in which the law has come about is 
therefore of great significance for the effect it has on NGOs. Russia’s Presidential Council 
for Human Rights, a consultative body established to assist the President in the exercise of 
his constitutional responsibilities, even suggested removing the wording from the entire 
document and replacing it with a more neutral description, such as “an NGO that receives 
funding from abroad for carrying out political activities”.133 
 
Certain statements expressed by both politicians and officials indicate that the wording 
seems to be chosen with the particular intent of discrediting organizations receiving 
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funding from abroad, making the public question their motives and legitimacy. Mr 
Sidyakin has said, “People who are invited to public demonstrations will know that they are 
invited by an NGO performing functions of a foreign agent”.134 A representative from the 
leading political party United Russia has also stated that “those NGOs who are engaged in 
political activity and are paid from abroad must have the status of foreign agent so the 
public could see who implant ideas into their mind and who pays for their work”.135 The 
term is therefore obviously chosen with the intention of creating suspicion regarding the 
information received from such associations, and weakening their overall credibility. In 
fact, on the same day that the law came into effect, the offices of two human rights 
organizations, For Human Rights and Memorial, were spray-painted with the word 
“Foreign Agent/Here resides Foreign Agent” and a heart with “USA” written next to it.136 
In addition to humiliating the dignity of the staff of the organizations in question and the 
trustees associated with them, these actions consequently damaged their professional 
reputation. Mr Tishaev also explained that there have also been a lot of provocative 
campaigns on the Internet discrediting human rights organizations, and also some 
demonstrations organized by pro United Russia Youth Group demanding that NGOs obey 
the law and register as foreign agents.137 The reputation of these organizations had thus 
already suffered, even without the law being formally enforced on them at that particular 
time. 
 
Several scholars on social organizations in Russia recognize that the atmosphere of 
contemporary Russian society is symbolized by pervasive mutual alienation and distrust 
among citizens, referred to as the “post communist syndrome”. Russian society regards the 
non-profit sector with suspicion, and most citizens consider charitable organizations to be a 
form of “organized theft”. The handicaps of social organizations in post communist Russia, 
and consequently the attitudes towards them, can thus be explained as an attitudinal legacy 
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of the Soviet system. It has fostered the growth of individualism in people’s values as a 
natural reaction to the collectivist way of thinking that was imposed by the party state 
regime.138 Such an outlook discourages most Russian citizens from participating 
voluntarily in the work of NGOs, and it also generates cynicism towards their actions in 
society. With such default general attitudes among the Russian population, a “foreign 
agents” status will inevitably reinforce and fortify the negative attitudes towards NGOs and 
the work that they do. 
 
Civil society organizations are dependent on working with legitimacy when operating on 
the ground among the general public. But maybe more importantly, they need credibility 
when working at a more structural level among state officials and politicians. The label will 
in practice make it very difficult for them to operate efficiently when advocating for 
changes in law or public policy, since civil servants and other interlocutors will be highly 
reluctant to cooperate with organizations carrying such status.139 This has already been 
evident in some regions of Russia. On the 9th of August 2012, the administration of the 
Mari-El region issued a directive to its own officials requesting them to refrain from 
participating in any social or public political activities organized by NGOs receiving 
funding from foreign sources.140  
 
Although the limitation comes in a form of damaged public opinion rather than a direct 
prohibition of any kind, it still amounts to an interference with the freedom of association 
and expression by creating a hostile environment for the NGOs to work in. Because they 
are dependent on their legal entity status and are required to register with the MoJ, and 
because of the lack of obtainable domestic and private funds, the organizations thus have to 
struggle to prove their objectivity in an already distrustful society. Having established the 
challenges that the law creates for the existence of NGOs, we must now evaluate the 
qualitative aspects of the provisions in order to determine the legitimacy of its articulation. 
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5.2 The law’s qualitative assessment 
As previously mentioned, any measure that restricts the freedom of assembly must entail 
certain characteristics in order to fulfil the criterion of being “prescribed by law”. Domestic 
law has to be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the persons concerned to 
foresee the consequences, which a given action might entail. It must also afford a level of 
protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities.141 To what degree can it 
be said that the law meets these qualitative demands?  
 
5.2.1 Vagueness of law 
The Foreign Agent law creates a new category of NGOs in the Russian legal system, 
namely those receiving foreign funding and performing “political activity”, which is a 
phrase lacking any definition in the Russian legal system, except by a way of prohibiting 
certain state officials (such as judges) on being members of political parties and therefore 
pursue such activity.142 The mere merits and scope of the term can be found in the Russian 
laws on public associations and on political parties, wherein both texts an organization is 
considered as political if it aims to “influence the political will of the population, 
participates in elections, or if it participated in, and forms, official authorities”.143 The Law 
on Foreign Agents however, expands this definition by incorporating new wording into the 
provision, such as “political action”, “state policy” and “shaping public opinion”.144 A 
further definition of these additional terms is absent, potentially resulting in a broadened 
interpretation.  
 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also raised this issue as 
one of the main concerns in Russia’s UPS summary paper. The document stressed that the 
lack of a “legal definition of the term ‘political activity’ could result in broad interpretation 
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whereby almost all human rights organizations would fall in the category of ´foreign 
agents´”.145 In fact, one of the very first initiatives and responses from the civil society 
organizations to the adoption of the law was to request a clarification of the term from 
acting Minister of Justice J. Konovalov in November 2012.146 The organizations, with the 
human rights organization AGORA and their lawyers in the forefront, were seeking 
explanations on the flexible terminology used in the provisions, maintaining that the law 
can be misinterpreted because of its vague articulation and unclear procedure, and that the 
concepts used are more or less inherent in all NGOs.147 The Ministry responded to the 
request that it was not authorized to answer such questions.148 
 
The ECtHR has through its practice acknowledged that legal certainty in law is in practice 
unattainable, and that too much certainty is in fact undesirable.149 When discussing such 
issues, it is helpful to have in mind what we can call “fact sensitivity” of a law. A law’s fact 
sensitivity is the degree to which the outcome of its application depends on the detailed 
factual context in which it is applied.150 A law that is written in rigid terms using concrete 
and very precise concept becomes fact insensitive, since its application would be very 
limited to a small number of very specific cases. Excessive rigidity may prevent those who 
apply the law from achieving the objective that lies behind it. A law can become more fact 
sensitive in two ways. One way is to make it more detailed, so that a wider range of 
parameters becomes relevant to how it might apply in any given case. The other way is to 
increase the practical decision-making, the degree of discretion, accredited to those who are 
in charge of applying the law. Making use of concepts that are somewhat imprecise and 
broad in nature fulfils this task.151 Such concepts thus call for an exercise of evaluative 
assessment in light of the particular facts of every case.  
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Because there are so many diverse NGOs in Russia with distinctive mandates and different 
working practices (which is a characteristic of the overall NGO community), the wording 
of the law does in fact require some degree of flexibility in order to be applicable to at least 
a significant number of them if it is supposed to fulfil its aim of transparency. There 
consequently exists a significant tension between the requirement of legal certainty and 
foreseeability deriving from the “prescribed by law” criterion, and the doctrine of 
proportionality. This principle encourages implementing adaptable laws, often involving a 
high degree of discretion on the part of decision-makers on its practical application. 
However, with this increase comes less certainty and the consequences of the law becomes 
less easy to predict.152 The relevant question in this case therefore becomes whether the 
definition of political activity used in the Foreign Agents Law is inappropriate, overly 
vague and transcends the permissible boundaries regarding foreseeability.  
 
5.2.2 Unsuitable use of the phrase “political activity” 
The establishment of NGOs as an alternative or a supplement to a political party is quite 
common among nationally based organizations that criticize and resist the government. The 
line between narrow human rights objectives and broader political ambitions is being 
blurred due to the ever-expanding definition attributed to human rights and the consistent 
broadening of NGO’s mandates.  At the same time, human rights organizations are opposed 
to being labelled as political since such a stamp might degrade their objectivity and 
impartiality. Difficulties also arise when NGOs expand their objectives, venturing into 
activities that represent a departure from the touchstone of human rights norms, again 
clouding the distinction between what defines a human rights organizations as opposed to a 
lobbying or activist organizations performing political activity.153 This expansion of NGO 
mandates and activities are creating unclear lines for what constitutes political activities 
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versus human rights work. The broadness of the phrase and its lack of a clear definition in 
the wording of the law is providing too much manoeuvring space for the MoJ in deciding 
which human rights activities are to be defined as political. Even the Ministry admitted 
their lack of authority in defining the outreach of the provisions.154 
 
Many of the leading Russian human rights organizations155 argue that the definition used in 
the law appears to cover the majority of their usual activities, consequently targeting all 
organizations that do any kind of human rights work, including election monitoring and 
environmental protection. In support of their claim, the NGOs refer to statements of a 
number of Russian commentators and experts. In the opinion of political commentator K. 
Rogov, the terminology used in the law was deliberately broad in order to cover human 
rights activity, including electoral rights.156 The political scientist working at the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Dimitriy Oreshkin, also supports this conclusion in his statement to 
the European Court. He says that the phrase “political activity” as a terminology is nowhere 
to be found in the Russian law. According to his statement, the broad nature of the term 
will consequently cover many of the normal human rights activities since they inevitably 
aim at strengthening the civil society, and definitely influencing public opinion – either 
directly or indirectly.157  
 
Neither of the organizations consider their activities as being “political”, which would be 
contrary to the NGOs constitutional or statutory documents, their financial agreements with 
donors and the overall common understanding of all the persons involved, including staff 
and board members.158 Promoting public awareness, dialogue with state bodies and aiming 
to secure transparency and accountability of State authorities are not political actions, 
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according to the organizations. The vagueness of the provisions is thus creating 
possibilities for the government to subjectively pinpoint organizations that should register 
as foreign agents. The recent enforcements of the law are confirming these concerns, such 
as with the case of the election monitoring organization Golos. To what degree can it be 
said that ensuring fair elections and discovering electoral fraud is a political action aimed at 
influencing the decision-making by state bodies or shaping public opinion intended for the 
change of state policy? Aren’t they rather actions aimed at ensuring just voting and 
securing liability of the Russian state – goals that should be preserved and fought for in any 
democratic society?  
 
The human rights organizations are claiming that from a legal perspective, the wording of 
the law and the definitions used are lacking significant clarity, thus preventing the NGOs 
from foreseeing the consequences of its application in relation to their activities. Since so 
many of them will potentially qualify as “political” it gives the MoJ too much power for in 
determining who should register as a foreign agent, and who should not, consequently 
opening up for arbitrary application. This claim can be strengthened by referring to the 
ECtHR concern regarding the use of the term “political” in other national legislation. In 
several cases, the Court has found violations of the Convention where the justifications for 
restrictions placed on associations are due to its perceived “political” objectives.159 It has 
stated that the term “political” can be considered overly and inherently vague and can be 
subject to diverse interpretations. Any classification based on such a criterion is liable to 
produce incoherent results and engender considerable uncertainty.160  
 
Although such fears are understandable, certain developments might prove that such 
outlooks are overly pessimistic. On 22 January 2013, the Russian newspaper Forbes wrote 
an article about a Russian human rights organization called Shield and Sword, which the 
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MoJ refused to register in their foreign agents list.161 The organization themselves 
voluntarily submitted the necessary documents for the inclusion into the registry - although 
they do not consider themselves as such - in order to understand how the law works from 
the inside, to force the Ministry to clarify the situation, and also to force an application of 
the law in order to be able to initiate legal proceedings. The MoJ decided that although the 
organization receives foreign funding, their activities that aim at eradicating instances of 
human rights violations within the Chuvash Republic, are not considered to be political 
activities. The Ministry concluded that; “The forms of political activity stated by the 
organization are directly governed by a set aim, and are not aimed at altering government 
policy”162  
 
Evidently, not all human rights organization’s actions will fall within the definition, and so 
the number of NGOs that might be targeted by the law might therefore prove to be smaller 
than feared. However, Shield and Sword can be seen a more low-key organization not 
posing any direct nuisance for the government, consequently not generating any need for 
closer oversight or stricter limitation. Memorial, which is one of oldest and most respected 
human right organization in Russia, has as previously mentioned recently been requested to 
register as a foreign agent. The NGO commits itself to research, human rights assistance, 
and information gathering as well as distribution about violations on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union.163 Neither of these actions would seem to be conducted in order to 
alter government policy or shape public opinion. Still, they became one of the primary 
targets of the provisions. Golos is a similar example, where a case is currently being filed 
against them for being in breach of the law. The documentations and reports of violations 
in parliamentary and presidential elections conducted by the organization resulted in 
massive public demonstrations. It seems as though the autonomy of NGOs and the 
importance of their work is creating demands for closer oversight and monitoring, and even 
the curbing of their funds and actions on behalf of the authorities. The possibility of such 
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selective application of the law is thus verifying its qualitative inadequacy. 
 
The balance criterion with regards to the discretion that should be given to the executive on 
one hand, and the precision of the law on the other does in light of these enforcements not 
appear to be proportionate, and is consequently contrary to the rule of law. The vagueness 
of the terminology seems to transcend the permissible boundaries regarding foreseeability, 
and consequently leaves too much discretion to the MoJ. The new terms added to the 
definition of political activity are consolidating its inadequacy, since these traits 
characterise a broad range of legitimate NGO activities. Any attempt on limiting such 
actions would constitute a setback for a democratic society. These weaknesses are thus not 
satisfying the qualitative demands needed for the “prescribed by law” criterion to be 
fulfilled. Although the ECtHR would declare interference as illegitimate if one of the 
criterions should not be fulfilled, we will for arguments sake move on to the next principle 
in order to further reinforce and strengthen the findings of this paper. 
 
5.3 Does the law pursue a legitimate aim? 
The overriding aim of the law seems to be to restrict and limit the influence of NGOs, 
which allegedly carry out “hostile activities” under the instructions of foreign sponsors 
pursuing “hostile interests”. President Putin recently stated, "No one has the monopoly of 
speaking on behalf of the entire Russian society, let alone the structures directed and 
funded from abroad and thus inevitably serving foreign interests," he said. "Any direct or 
indirect meddling in our internal affairs, any forms of pressure on Russia, on our allies and 
partners is inadmissible".164 Can these intentions fall within the aim of a restriction that is 
adopted in order to protect “national security”? 
 
The European Court has stated that the aims articulated in Article 11§2 are to be interpreted 
narrowly in order to avoid abuse, and that their content should not be broadened beyond 
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their usual meaning.165 According to the Siracusa Principles, “national security” may be 
invoked only when they are taken to protect the mere territorial or political existence of a 
nation against a threat of force, and not to prevent relatively isolated threats to law and 
order. It should neither be used as a pretext for adopting vague and arbitrary limitations. If 
a State is systematically violating human rights, it is then consequently also jeopardizing 
international peace and security, and it cannot invoke national security as a justification for 
introducing measures that are aimed at suppressing opposition to such violations.166 It has 
been the fear among the civil society that the Foreign Agent Law was introduced in order 
to limit the operational ability of organizations that are critical of the government. These 
suspicions have to a certain degree been confirmed by the recent enforcements of the law, 
but also when considering it in light of the other recently adopted legislation that target 
both organizations and other individuals in political opposition. Many of the NGOs that 
potentially fall within the scope of the law are working with the documentation and 
distribution of violations of human rights in the Russian territory. The regulation is 
consequently aimed at preventing what the authorities consider to be threats to the current 
law and order, and not at protecting the mere existence of the nation. This criterion is, 
however, is the most difficult one to determine because of the broadness of the terms. 
Restrictive measures will often therefore fulfill this condition in the European Courts 
practice.167  
 
5.4 Necessary in a democratic society?  
If we assume that the aim was legitimate, the measure used to achieve that purpose will be 
proportionate, and thereby necessary, if it fulfils a pressing social need and if it does not 
restrict the freedom of association to a larger extent than is necessary. The notion of 
necessity is difficult to grasp, and the ECtHR has noted that it is not synonymous with 
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“indispensable”, nor “allowed”, “usual”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “wishful”.168 The 
limitation should thus have an aspect of inevitability, and the reasons for its 
implementation have to “relevant and sufficient”. The national authorities consequently 
have to prove that they have applied standards that are in conformity with the principles 
embodied in Art.11, and that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of 
relevant facts.169 The reference to a democratic society means that this proportionality 
assessment must be considered in light of the basic values of a democratic society. There 
must accordingly be a balance between the severity of the restriction and the reasons for its 
adoption. An evaluation of the importance of the right in its social context, the extent of the 
limitation, its intensity, dimension and probability must be considered on the one side of 
the scale. On the other side, we have the importance of the goal in view of its content, the 
urgency of its realization reflected in the harm that would be caused absent the 
restriction.170 The following sections address such considerations, but first there is a need to 
establish whether the regulations were based on adequate evaluations of relevant facts 
when determining the necessity of introducing the law.  
 
5.4.1 Based on acceptable assessment of relevant facts? 
It is difficult to search for solid proof that substantiates the scepticism that the Russian 
authorities are feeling towards foreign funded NGOs that could substantiate that there was 
a pressing social need for the adoption of the law. The national authorities have to prove 
that they based their decisions to introduce the regulation on an acceptable assessment of 
relevant facts.171 There have not been any concrete incidents of deliberate influencing of 
political processes through financial support that could support their arguments, although 
these could of course be potentially be hard to detect. Vladimir Novitski, President of the 
Russian Section of the International Society for Human Rights, has expressed in an 
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interview that he does not believe that any of the human rights organizations are pursuing 
such an objective. “I do not know of any grants that were positioned to undermine the 
Russian State, to bring about an illegal change of power, to criticize wrongfully acts of 
national institutions or civil servants. On the contrary - all furthering activities by the 
European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or 
other private or international funds in Russia position themselves on development of a civil 
society”.172  
 
Also as previously indicated, the foundations and organizations that distribute grants to 
NGOs are all highly respected, credible and well-known foundations that provide open and 
transparent processes when providing grant funding.173 Without concrete facts to base their 
decisions on, the interference seems to be based on a genuine misunderstanding of the 
goals and aims of both the sponsors and the role of NGOs in society. The Russian State is 
failing to demonstrate that these dangers that the Foreign Agent Law is supposed to protect 
them from are real and urgent, and not only hypothetical.  
 
5.4.2 Importance of the right vis-à-vis need for restriction 
If the importance of preventing certain limitations of a right depends on the importance of 
the right itself, then it is decisive for the survival and well functioning of a democratic 
society that freedom of association and expression be placed under limitations only when 
absolutely necessary. Because civil society is such a crucial element of a democracy, the 
protections afforded to its actors are of great importance for the overall community.  
 
This is maybe even more so the case in a country such as Russia, where the early 
development of the NGO sector and civil society was slow. Civil society was essentially 
non-existent in the Soviet Union because of the state controlled tradition that dominated the 
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Russian communist ideology.174 Although the proliferation of such organizations has been 
substantial during the last decades, there still is a long way to go, and their need to establish 
themselves firmly in the Russian society is critical for the promotion and further 
development of a sustainable democracy. The European Court has on several occasions 
emphasized the special protection afforded to political parties in the context of Article 11 
and 10. This is because their actions are seen as giving invaluable contribution to political 
dialogue.175 The NGO’s function can be compared to that of political parties, and even the 
law itself specifically targets those organizations performing “political activities”. This 
reasoning could therefore be expanded to also embrace NGOs, especially those who have 
taken on the function of watchdogs on the national authorities. The margin of appreciation 
given to the contracting State should thus be narrow, where the authorities are called upon 
to present particularly important reasons to justify an imposed restriction.176 It can be 
argued that the importance of preventing the restriction of freedom of association and 
expression in the Russian context is therefore reasonably high based on these assessments.  
 
5.4.3 The extent and intensity of the interference 
The Court has held that the ECHR does not prevent State authorities from laying down 
what they consider are reasonable legal formalities as to the “establishment, functioning or 
internal organizational structure of NGOs”.177 The authorities would point to the fact that 
the Foreign Agent Law doesn’t in any way restrict or prohibit the organizations from 
seeking foreign funding. It only establishes reasonable formalities with regards to their 
objectivity, claiming that the intensity of the restriction is very low and does not hinder the 
organizations’ work in any way. Having already argued otherwise with regards to the 
consequences of the foreign agents status in chapter 5.1, the proportionality balance of the 
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remaining provisions of the law should also be evaluated against the requirements they 
stipulate. 
 
5.4.3.1 Scope of the law broader than the aim 
Firstly, the law stipulates that NGOs must register themselves as foreign agents if they 
receive finances from foreign sources, and that they participate in political activities 
including (but not exclusively) in the interest of foreign donors. Irrespective of the 
influence or interest of their backers, they still need to register and are still subject to the 
same restrictions under the law, ultimately bearing the same harmful consequences.178 The 
status of foreign agent will necessarily disrupt the work of all “politically active” NGOs, 
and damage their credibility accordingly. The articulation of the law is therefore broader 
than the stated aims, and targets all organizations disproportionately. If there actually were 
organizations in Russia carrying out policies in the name of their donors, they would most 
likely only account for a minor percentage of the overall NGO society. Having a law that is 
aimed to targets only a small fraction of such organizations, but instead sweeps all 
politically active, foreign funded NGOs within its scope in order to make sure that the 
provisions reach those intended, is hence considered as overly excessive and unfounded.  
 
5.4.3.2 Excessive reporting 
Secondly, the need for even more administrative reporting requirements is heavily 
questioned when considering the regulations that were already in place before the adoption 
of the law. The 2006 amendments already demanded reporting with details on the attained 
amounts and its actual spending, received from both domestic and foreign sources. The 
additional series of reporting obligations that the law requires might therefore appear as 
unwarranted in order for the sate to control the objectivity of the activities of the NGOs.179 
Several experts on accountability have established that the additional reporting obligations 
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introduced by the Law on Foreign Agents are excessive, inexpedient and most importantly 
unnecessary in order for the state to control the lawfulness of the activities of NGOs. Pavel 
Gamolskiy, Chair of Club of Accountants and Auditors of NGOs, has stated that the law 
obliges the NGOs “to provide excessive information, which is unnecessary for the effective 
state control, planning and management”.180 Maria Kanevskaya, Director of Human Rights 
Resources Center and Tatiana Chernyaeva, Executive Director of the Club of Accountants 
and Auditors of St. Petersburg have agreed that, “the obligation to provide these report 
quarterly is inappropriate because it increases expenses not only of an NGO but also 
additionally burdens state bodies”.181 
 
In light of these statements and considerations, one can hardly agree that there was a 
“pressing social need” for introducing more regulations aimed at ensuring transparency and 
the prevention of foreign meddling. Additional administrative and financial tasks seem 
disproportionate in light of the already existing oversight regulations.  
 
5.4.3.3  Disproportionate sanctions 
The third consideration is concerning the sanctions that the law imposes vis-à-vis the 
severity of the disobedience. The Law on Foreign Agents establishes a series of civil, 
administrative and criminal sanctions for non-compliance.182 When reviewing the initial 
draft of the law, Russia’s Supreme Court noted that the provisions establishes criminal 
responsibility not in respect of any dangerous act committed by an NGO or it leaders, but 
merely for the refusal to register themselves as foreign agents. The text that was adopted 
did not differ from the draft with regards to these comments. The law therefore blurs the 
distinction between what constitutes a criminal offence, and an administrative offence.183  
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The refusal to register in a separate roaster cannot be said to proportionally correspond to 
the severity of the sanctions that the law has specified. Such radical measures that lead to 
both criminalization and ultimately liquidation of legal entity as a result of non-compliance 
with the demands that the law places on the organizations contravenes the European 
Court’s principle of proportionality. The Court has also through its case law established 
that the dissolution of an association should only be applied in exceptional cases of very 
serious misconduct.184  
 
5.4.4 Social benefits of restriction 
Proportionality in it strict sense includes balancing the social benefits of realizing the goal 
versus the harm that the restriction causes.185 The purpose of the Foreign Agent Law is 
accordingly not only to ensure organizational transparency for the authorities, but also to 
ensure that the general public knows whom they attain their information from. The 
necessity of compelling the NGOs to register with such a status can be questioned when 
considering other less invasive options that could potentially fulfil the same aim. A 
registration list for foreign funded NGOs could be established, but instead of labelling them 
with a negatively associated term, this list could be made available for those interested in 
seeking this type of information, which is actually the appropriate procedure as prescribed 
in the Civil Code, Art. 51§1.186 Another easier and less invasive solution would be to use a 
more neutral description that could convey the same message, without damaging the 
reputation of the organizations. 
 
The importance of the awareness that comes with such transparency cannot be said to be 
proportionate to the damage that the Foreign Agent Law is causing for NGOs. It is also 
highly doubtful how such transparency will ensure objectivity and directly prevent foreign 
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meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. Obtaining foreign funds doesn’t automatically 
indicate that you are performing the work on behalf of the donor. How then does such 
reporting and insight prevent potential intrusion? The emphasis must therefore be on the 
notion of prevention, meaning that the possible intent behind introducing the foreign agents 
label was to actually discourage NGOs from seeking and obtaining funds from abroad, 
consequently affecting their right to seek and secure resources as prescribed in the DHRD. 
The authorities must accordingly have assumed that NGOs would not want to register 
under such conditions, and would rather seek resources elsewhere in order to not lose their 
credibility, or their legal entity status. Due to the limited funds available in Russia, the 
outcome of such an option is threatening the survival of many NGOs.  
 
The urgency of realizing a measure is reflected in the harm that would be caused absent of 
the restriction, as well as probability of that harm.187 In light of the already existing civil 
society regulation and reporting that was in place before the adoption, it is hard to argue 
that the general public was in eager need of knowing who is funding the civil society 
organizations. Particularly not when weighted against the necessity to safeguard the 
freedom of association and expression within the Russian societal context. The intensity 
and dimension of the restriction vis-à-vis the importance and urgency of the goal are 
unevenly balanced, and it is accordingly hard to conclude that the interference was 
“necessary in a democratic society”.  
 
6 Conclusion 
The role that NGOs have in society is conditioned on their independence. There is therefore 
a prerequisite of autonomy in order for these groups to freely be able to exercise their right 
to freedom of association and expression. First of all, they are heavily reliant on external 
resources because of their not-for-profit character. Optimally and for the sake of their 
objectivity, these should include a mixture of both international and governmental grants. 
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Second, they need legitimacy and credibility to be able to work within the society, both 
among the general population, but ultimately also with state officials and other 
stakeholders. They are therefore also dependent on a friendly legal environment that 
encourages and welcomes their views and findings as valuable to the overall well being of 
society. They should also be free to function as efficiently as possible, without the 
hindrance of unnecessary and excessive administrative and managerial tasks that take up 
their time and focus. And their role as watchdogs ensuring transparency of the actions of 
public authorities should be conducted without the fear of prosecution and unjustifiable 
sanctions, especially NGOs working with politically sensitive issues.  
 
The freedom of association and expression have come under increasing attack after 
Vladimir Putin’s third inauguration as Russia’s President, despite the fact that these rights 
are explicitly guaranteed by the Russian Constitution and legally binding international 
human rights treaties to which Russia is a part of. The findings of this research indicate that 
he Foreign Agent Law manages to affect and disrupt all the abovementioned conditions 
simultaneously. It intrudes their right to seek and secure resources through creating 
conditions that strongly discourage “politically active” NGOs from seeking international 
grants because of the foreign agent status that accompanies such obtainment. Even if the 
prospects of acquiring state or private funding were good in Russia, this would again raise 
issues with regards to the independence and capacity to be monitors on state power when 
their overall financial stability is dependent on funding from the government.188 However, 
because of the lack of such domestic grants, it leaves them with no other option than to 
register in order to maintain their legal entity status. This label, because of the associations 
that it carries with it, damages their reputation to the point where their operations are 
severely affected. Their credibility and legitimacy is significantly impaired, making it hard 
for them to efficiently perform their work at all levels of society.  
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Ironically, the law is introducing alterations to federal laws that were in fact created with 
the precise intention of establishing reliability and trustworthiness to NGOs after a critical 
period of low NGO confidence and disillusionment among the public.189 The effects of 
introducing the amendments are therefore working against the aim of the regulations that 
they are modifying. Also, the administrative reporting requirements that the law places on 
them are further disrupting their focus and managerial resources that could instead be 
allocated elsewhere, especially since it has been recognized that these demands are not 
necessary for the sate to control the objectivity of the activities of the NGOs.190 The law 
also has an aspect of intimidation because of the severity of the series of civil, 
administrative and criminal sanctions that is establishes for non-compliance, which 
ultimately blur the distinction between what constitutes a criminal offence, and an 
administrative offence.191  
 
The provisions of the law are clearly directed at restricting the independence and authority 
of these organizations, in order to limit their influence in society. This is accomplished by 
the subtle introduction of seemingly neutral wording into the provisions, vague articulation 
of the law as well as wide margin of discretion accredited to the Ministry of Justice 
allowing for arbitrary application. The paper therefore argues that in the absence of any 
alternatives, the NGOs falling within the scope of the law are forced to register as foreign 
agents consequently damaging their reputation to the degree where they loose credibility 
and legitimacy and cannot perform the work competently. The findings therefore indicate a 
violation of the limitation clauses as stipulated in the ECHR, Art. 11§2 and 10§2.  
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Eleven of the leading Russian human rights NGOs192 have contested the law by lodging an 
application to the European Court on the 6th of February 2013, asserting the status of so-
called “potential victims”.193 None of the organizations had been targeted at the time of the 
submission, but the recent enforcements and filed cases are confirming their fears and 
consolidating their claims. The question remains whether the ECtHR would establish 
interference with freedom of association and expression based on the notion of damaged 
reputation and public opinion. The Court has not exercised such practise at any previous 
occasions. The probability of repealing the law if a violation will be declared is surely an 
overly optimistic assumption. However a clarification of the vague terminology used, and 
an overall moderation of the law should as a consequence be encouraged. 
 
The Russian Federation is increasingly stifling governmental critics by introducing a 
mixture of legal and administrative obstacles, repressions, fines and inspections. Smaller 
and somewhat camouflaged limitations and regulations have been adopted in order to 
achieve a bigger goal of restricting dissent more broadly, as can be seen with the recent 
adoption of several laws that limit the freedom of association and expression. One way to 
interpret these measures is to look at them as clear demonstration of state power. Another is 
to consider them as indications of government insecurity, with regards to the potential 
power and influence that NGOs and the overall civil society is holding. They are then 
consequently nothing less than clear signs of weakness of the Russian authorities trying to 
hastily limit or delay the potential outcomes of such criticism.  
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